Analysis Of Experience Organizational Change Management Essay

Analysis Of Experience Organizational Change Management Essay Todays organizations are facing a continually changing world, unpredictable and fast-paced environment that require constant restudying to change. For an organization to be successful in this modern world it is ultimately for organization to regularly evaluate the need for them to change to stay up to date. Organizational change enables a company to strive to stay competitive and profitable. In 2006, Seagate Technology (NASDAQ: STX) had acquired Maxtor Corporation; Maxtor was an American manufacturer of computer conventional disk drives and the third largest in the world prior to acquisition. In 2008, some commentators argue that Solid-state drive (SSD) challenge may give threat to Seagate steady as a worlds largest manufacturer of conventional disk drives. Organizations likely to be struggling to survive if fail to meet the challenges and demands of both the external and internal environment factors. Today environment is erratic and does not stand still, so organizations cannot assu me that the future is stagnant, there is a need for organizations to continuously review their vision, strategies, technologies and goals based on changing environment and technological. As Charles Darwin quotes that It is not the strongest of the species that survives, nor the most intelligent that survives. It is the one that is the most adaptable to change. Jai B. P. Sinha (2008: 352) states that there is two-dimensional view of organizational change, where organizational change can be triggering by external and internal factors, either unplanned or planned. The unplanned change is usually reacting to ad hoc measures that company does not anticipate and it may cause distraction to operation. For examples, change of government policy, critical incidents due to lacking of skills, unscheduled tools maintenance due to lacking of preventive measurement, and missing standard operating procedures. The planned change is usually change of organization business plans and organization restructuring, such as offer competitive pricing in the market, redesign or align roles and responsibilities to improve productivity and employees morale. The effective outcome of unplanned and planned change both can be effective and ineffective; basically it depends on how efficient of the strategic plans that put into practical effect. There are many external triggers for organizational change. For example, in 2011, Europe solar industry sees hurt and affected with legal environment factor when UK government announced plans to introduce a cut to the Feed-In Tariff scheme (FIT) for large solar energy enterprises. Such legal constraints may have serious negative impact on an industry and would hurt organization budget and react unintentional, such as cease some of its operations and will cost jobs lost and low morale. Globalization is another key external factor in the world economy and could be a good or bad for organization. Globalization has brought in new opportunities to developing countries or third world countries. For example, international companies in Asia have big advantages with better government subsidies and lower labor costs. In order for developed countries companies to stay competitive they must be consistently review their strategic plans so be more innovative than overseas competitors, such as real locate their manufacturing business to overseas countries. Likewise, new technological advances make present company struggle to stay competitive. Nokia Corp profit has been suffered badly due to lacks of new technology or model to challenge smart phone, such as Apple iPhone and Samsung Galaxy. An organization has to continuously research and develop new technology in order having ability to challenge the threat from competitors and demanding customers. Internal triggers are the factors happening within the organization itself. For example, workplace abuse or high stress employees can lead to low morale and low performance; it will affect the productivity, staff turnover, or legal issue. For example, in 2012, China Company Foxconn Technology has reported several suicides cases at its factories in southern china, which is a major supplier to Apple, Dell and Hewlett-Packard. Some commentators revealed that the issue may due to poor management policies that workers have force to keep up with the machines speed and not allowed to talk to each other in the workshop. Therefore, it is an obligation that organization has to response to the incident and investigates to identify what are the factors caused the incident. Organization must decide and implement a strategic change to resolve the incident and prevent from reoccurring. Also the change has to include the plan how to calm, raise employees morale and motivate employees. Huczynski and Buchanan (2010: 565-566) discussed that one way to distinguish type of change is to consider how deeply they penetrate the organization. However it does not mean that all change must be deep change to be a good change. The depths of organization intervention are surface, shallow, penetrating, deep, and transformation. The surface or fine tuning is an appropriate to minor issue, where the deep change is appropriate when dealing with major change. For example, in 2009, the deep change will be appropriates for Chartered Semiconductor Company when the company acquired by the main stockholder of Global Foundries Inc, and it required to change to align and transform their corporate mission, vision and values. Kurt Lewin (1985) change theory contains three stage model of change, unfreezing->moving->refreezing. Based on Kurt Lewin unfreezing model, it can be comprehend that organization has to be aware to the changing world and willing to accept change when get trigger. The second step, moving, it is the period to identify appropriate strategic planning and ability to influence to implement the change. The third step, refreezing, it is a step to settle down the change and stabilization of behavior, and then get ready for next change. There is a potential failure to the change if the change does not settle down soon enough in the refreezing period, because the impact to human behavior may be considered risky if stabilization of behavior unable to execute promptly. Also, the ability for continuous of the change would be depends on how fast or how effective the organization to settle down the change, where the change must be accepted and practiced consistently by members of organization. Pennington Change Model (2006) suggests that proposed changes can be placed along two scales: radical incremental and core peripheral. Plotting the character of a proposed change along these scales can provide a sense of how difficult the introduction of any particular initiative might be and how much disturbance to the status quo it might generate. Radical change is generally is a dramatic change and require employees to move far apart or react very differently to a change. However incremental change does not necessary is better that radical change in term of resistance of change. It is still depends how well of organization mitigating resistance and encouraging people. Organizations have always met with resistance to change because human naturally tend to resist change. Huczynski and Buchanan (2010: 567) discussed that the Elizabeth Kubler-Ross (1969) model has addresses human reaction associated with change. The five stages in the Kubler-Ross coping cycle are denial, anger, bargaining, depression, and acceptance. The five sets of emotional may not all experience by employee throughout the change process. However by understanding the response of people during change, organization will be better ready to promote the change. Huczynski and Buchanan also discussed the Yerkes-Dodson law, which first observed by Robert M. Yerkes and John D. Dodson (1908). The Yerkes-Dodson law argues that human performance increases with arousal or stress increases, however it sees an inverted U-shaped function between arousal and performance. A certain amount of arousal can be a good motivator toward change such as employees may work and learn better with little pressur e. However too little arousal has a sluggish affect too and performance will be slow. When arousal reach an optimal level, the individual will has a hyperactive affect such as overloaded and exhausted and performance will start to drop. How organization response to resistance is very important, such as by force could increase resistance and turnover. The degree of readiness, understanding, commitment and compromise by employees can help to accelerate the change process. According to Huczynski and Buchanan (2010: 567), Arthur Bedeian (1980) has states there are four reasons that certain people resist change are parochial self-interest (concerned), Misunderstanding, Low tolerance to change, and Different assessments of the situation. To manage or overcome the resistance to change, Kotter and Schlesinger (2008) have identify 6 methods for dealing with resistance of change. The methods are Education and commitment, Participation and involvement, Facilitation and support, Negotiation and agreement, Manipulation and co-optation, and Implicit and explicit coercion. These 6 methods have their own advantages and disadvantages, however this is a model that organization can use as guidance, and apply it wisely on right situation to prevent or minimize resistance to change in organizations. Jai B. P. Sinha (2008: 354) discussed that culture plays an important role in organizational change processes. Huczynski and Buchanan highlight that Edgar Schein (1985) model sees culture as a three levels: Surface manifestations (the visible aspects of an organizations culture: object and behaviors that can be seen, heard and felt), Values and beliefs (strategies, goals and philosophies), and Basic assumptions (unconscious, taken for granted beliefs, thoughts and perceptions). It is a challenge for culture change to support organizational change, such as what are the best approaches to change people belief and corporate values so that can align with both internal and external factors that resulting from organizational change. Additional, organizational climate and culture are go hand in hand. The culture and climate are both important aspects to organization and have the strong impact during organizational change. Organization change must be always focusing to seek balance between culture and climate throughout the change process. It is very difficult to implement and sustain the organizational change without a properly strategies to manage the climate. The reason is because climate or individual psychological climate such as attitudes, behavior and feelings in the organization are easier to be affected, especially during transformation change that affect organizational mission and strategy. However with a right strategic planning, thorough assessment of organizational human behavior, and the consistent commitment of organizational from both shareholders and top management, so the change may accomplishable and sustainable. For example, Micron Semiconductor Inc had open and respect climates: Managers in op en and respect climates are often look more pleasant and easier to work with, hence it will be much better performance that the managers in closed and contempt climates. With strong culture and right values, everyone in the organization will be having the common perspective in mind and working toward a common goal. As Frances Hesselbein quotes that, Culture does not change because we desire to change it. Culture changes when the organization is transformed; the culture reflects the realities of people working together every day. There are really no specific model is the best for organizational change. Organization should proactive continuously learning to identify better ways of develop the innovative strategic planning for driving effective change in organizations by the team members. The successful implementation of organizational change will be depends on how well the ability of leaders or management in choosing the right strategic planning, and implement it ethically. Although change in today fast-paced world is often essential to keep up, however managing organizational change requires skill. Organizational change can be sabotaged if key members refuse to align with the new strategies, because resistance to change is a natural human phenomenon. Hence, all members of organization have to involve and be aligned with the change process, and then integrate their efforts to the organizational change towards the achievement of ultimate organizational goal. The consistent commitment from both senior management and employees are the main key for organization change to succeed. As Jai B. P. Sinha (2008: 369) say that although changes are inevitable and only those who adjust with them survive, effective organizations plan changes for improving individual and organizational performance and well-being of the employees. ASSIGNMENT 1: REFERENCES/BIBLIOGRAPHY Bradford University School of Management, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 20010, 2011, 2012. Managing People (MP) Study Book. David A. Buchanan and AndrzeJ A. Huczynski, Organizational Behavior. 7 Editions. 1985, 2010. Jai B. P. Sinha, Culture and Organizational Behavior, First Published in 2008 by SAGE Publications India Pvt Ltd. Jeff Dooley, A holw-Person/Systemic Approach to organization Change Management, copyright 1998. Retrieved on July 1, 2012, from http://www.well.com/user/dooley/change.pdf Michael W. Durant, Durant, CCE, CPA. Managing Organ0izational Change. 1999. Retrieved on July 1, 2012, from http://www.crfonline.org/orc/pdf/ref4.pdf Charles Darwin quotes. Retrieved July 1, 2012, from http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/c/charles_darwin.html Running Head: Organizational Change. Retrieved July 1, 2012, from http:///www.advanceessays.com/samples/Organizational_Change.pdf JISC InfoNet, Change Management. Retrieved July 1, 2012, from http://www.jiscinfonet.ac.uk/infokits/change-management/printable-version.pdf Sam Kogan, Gen3 Partners, October 10, 2006. How IT companies can stay competitive in a global market. Retrieved July 1, 2012, from http://www.zdnet.com/news/how-it-companies-can-stay-competitive-in-a-global-market/149830 20 Awesome Quotes on Change Management. Retrieved July 1, 2012, from http://www.torbenrick.eu/blog/change-management/20-awesome-quotes-on-change-management/ Michael Birnbaum and Anthony Faiola, Published: March 19. Solar industry faces subsidy cuts in Europe. Retrieved July 1, 2012, from http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/solar-industry-faces-subsidy-cuts-in-europe/2012/03/10/gIQArkbXLS_story.html Chandrasekaran Balakrishnan, Impact of Globalisation on Developing Countries and India. Retrieved July 1, 2012, from http://economics.about.com/od/globalizationtrade/l/aaglobalization.htm By Malcolm Moore in Shanghai, 27 May 2010. Inside Foxconns suicide factory Retrieved July 1, 2012, from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/china-business/7773011/A-look-inside-the-Foxconn-suicide-factory.html ASSIGNMENT 2: ESSAY QUESTION Why have managers and researchers been so interested in leadership theories to develop effective work performance? Today, a lot of managers and researchers have gone into searching the perfect leadership solution and ideas to achieve organization effectiveness. Many different leadership theories have emerged; some of the popularly adopted leadership theories have evolved over time and have developed their own lines of thoughts and debates endlessly. The leadership theories may have understood and differentially by managers and researchers. And leaders applied these adopted leadership theories as guidance and generate new ideas to strive for their organizational effectiveness in today fast-pace environment. Huczynski and Buchanan (2010: 596) state that Leadership appears to be a critical determinant of organizational effectiveness. Yuki (2002: 7) defines that leadership as Leadership is the process of influencing others to understand and agree what needs to be done and how to can be done effectively, and the process of facilitating individual and collective efforts to accomplish the shared objecti ve. The preceding two arguments may reach an understanding that leadership in organizations is a critical process of influencing and facilitating others to develop effective work performance. The benchmark to measure how well the effective work performance may depends on how well the ability of leaders understand the adopted leadership theories as the conceptual template to demonstrate in actual life and business situations. The clearer a leader can comprehend or perceive it the more effective leader can get into the act. Hence we can argue that the better theory and models enables leader to act more effectively to develop effective work performance. Is boss or manager a leader? Huczynski and Buchanan (2010: 598) discussed that Warren Bennis and Burt Nanus (1985, P.21) observed that managers do things right, while leaders do the right thing. John Kotters (1990) contrast different functions between leaders and managers, such as Leader establish direction and aligning people, where Manager plans and budget, and Organizing and staffing. Managers have the authority and power in organization to do certain tasks but it does not simply mean the manager is a leader. Some leaders may not have any formal authority but have the ability to influence the behavior of group of people to achieve goal. Individuals can learn to lead and develop their leadership. Jai B. P. Sinha (2008: 354) discussed that Whether managers are developed into leaders depends first of all their own efforts to rise above their routine functions, expand their roles, and cultivate beliefs, dispositions, skills, and styles that make them stand out from others around them. Organizations also play a facilitating role by creating conditions and devising mechanisms transcend their managerial roles. There are many leadership theories that individuals or managers can stick at for learning and developing leadership skills. Apparently, managers interested in leadership theories to develop into leaders and ability to develop effective work performance. Theories of leadership tend to serve a guideline for organization to apply all factors and components of effective leadership into a framework and establishing a culture. Early leadership theories tend to focus upon the trait approach, style approach and contingency approach, where characteristics and behaviors affects leadership; the later new leadership theories tend to focus upon the organizational vision, transactional, transformational, role of followers, the contextual nature of leadership. Each leadership theories provides a personal models or concepts that given management a direction, however each theories does has their own advantages and problems. The next few paragraphs will provide more insight look of some typical theories of leadership: Great man theory, Trait theory, Style theory, Contingency theory, Transactional leader, and Transformational leader. In 19th century, the Great man theory was a popular idea which identifies leaders are born and not made. Great leaders will arise when there is a great need. Huczynski and Buchanan (2010: 599) explained that the theory as Great Man are born leaders, and emerge to take power, regardless of the social, organizational or history context. It can be said that history leaders were male and primary focus on man only, and great man are born with destined to lead. Next similar theory of leadership is a Trait theory. The Trait theory is the ideas which identify leaders are the people born with inherited leadership characteristic or traits that make these people suited to become leader. According to Huczynski and Buchanan (2010: 599), Ralph Stoghill (1948, 1974) had reviewed hundreds of trait studies. Some of his typical characteristics list are strong drive for responsibilities, focus on completing the task, vigor and persistence in pursuit of goals, venturesomeness and originally in problem-solving, drive to exercise initiative in social setting, self-confidence, sense of personal identity, willingness to accept consequences of decisions and actions, readiness to absorb interpersonal stress, willingness to tolerate frustration and delay, ability to influence the behavior of others. However researchers argue that the research did not find a consistent set of leadership traits, those attributes could not be determined, and do not appear to be un ique to leaders. Later Shaw and Fraser (1976, 1978) identified the following skills as a traits leader: ability (intelligence, relevant knowledge, and verbal facility), sociability (participation, cooperativeness, popularity, motivation (initiative and persistence). Some commentators argue that this theory remains gender issues in leadership and a person without trait or some of the traits are not possible for him to be a leader. The Trait theory was abandoned after researchers switched attention to leadership behavior patterns. After the Trait theory, Style or Behavioral style theory has emerged and most commentators considered that this is a big jump from Trait theory. Researchers identified that Style theory is a theory look at what a leader actually do, the traits and the leadership capabilities and qualities are not inherited. It assumes that leaders are not born; leadership behavior and capability can be learned hence leaders can be made through training. Successful leadership is definable and learnable. Huczynski and Buchanan (2010: 606) discussed that in 1940s to early of 1950s, Survey Research Center in Michigan with Katz et al had identified two dimensions of leadership: employee-centered behavior and job-centered behavior. The style of leadership based on employee-centered behavior is focusing on relationship and employee needs. The leadership has a concern of people as priority, which always strives to solve the problems of followers, concerns the needs of followers, and development of followers. The style of leadership based on job-centered behavior is focusing on getting the job done. The leadership put the priority on achievement and meeting goals. In 1953a to 1951, Bureau of Business Research at Ohio State University also identified two types of leaderships behavior which are consideration and initiating structure. The style of leadership based on consideration behavior is focusing on relationships and needs oriented. The leadership allows followers to share ideas and make decisions together. The style of leadership based on initiating structure is focusing on job-centered, which structure tasks and assign works, and expect follower to follow instruction to act accordingly. However there are some concerns raised against Style theories, such as how well leader can fix to the given style of leadership behavior, and what if a person unwilling or unable to learn the given behavior. As Thompson and McHugh (2002) states that others have recognized that situational, environmen t and contextual factors all potentially influence and effectiveness of different leadership. Huczynski and Buchanan (2010: 610) identified that Contingency theory of leadership of Fred Fiedler (1967) as a perspective which argues that leader must adjust their style in a manner consistent with aspects of the context. This is a model describes the leadership effectiveness is depends on relationship between leader behavior or style and the favorable of the situation. The favorable of the situation can be influenced by three key factors, which are the degree of relationship and trust between leader and team members, the degree of task structure, and the positional power of leader. The theory can promote better relationships between leaders and workers. The theory also can help leader to familiar and not confuse with the tasks structure, hence achieve better effectiveness. Theoretically this theory judge the leader performance is depends on their abilities, not by gender or person background. However some commentators argue this theory is often fails when tested in real-life situ ation. And the approach should identify a leader not just by positional power, but should evaluate the person leadership competencies to deal with bad situation. Also this theory is difficult to assess the three key factors and not really identify the need of team members. In the late twentieth century, new leaderships have emerged. The new leader focuses on the key role of heroic, powerful, visionary, and charismatic. Huczynski and Buchanan (2010: 617) defined that New leader an inspirational visionary, concerned with building shared senses of purpose and mission, creating a culture in which everyone is aligned with the organizations goals and is skilled and empowered to achieve them. Later the new leadership was distinguished by McGregor Burns (1978) between transactional leader and transformational leader. Huczynski and Buchanan (2010: 618) suggest that Transactional leader a leader who treats relationships with followers in terms of an exchange, giving followers what they want in return for what the leader desires, following prescribed tasks to pursue established goals. This theory basically is a model that business agreement or exchange made between an employee and an organization or leader, where completion of tasks through reward or penalty. The benefits of this theory are people are easier to motivate through rewards or penalty. Also organization has the full authority, control and commitment from employee once employee agrees with the agreement. However this theory will limit the people development because people never has chance to learn to think because they are just require to follow instruction as per agreement. This leadership model may create a stressful work environment because upper level leaders hard to identify lower level leaders to help in managing people or tasks. So me commentators see that this leadership is unable to promote or creating an innovation culture within organization that encourage employees participation and contribution for improving organization effectiveness. Transformational leadership is an effective charismatic leadership theory. Huczynski and Buchanan (2010: 618) suggest that Transformation leader a leader who treats relationships with followers in terms of motivation and commitment, influencing and inspiring followers to give more than mere compliance to improve organizational performance. This leadership theory will improve organizational behavior and changing organizational climate. Hence people tend to improve effectiveness through self motivation and commitment to their work and organization. However this theory is highly depends on the ability of the organization leaders to influence, motivate and inspire people. There are numbers of leadership theories describe the processes of how a leader developed, influence, motivate, and empower people. Leaders have the flexibility in identifying right theories for them or their organization. These leadership theories and leadership principles are evolving over time. Undoubtedly, Leadership theories and strategic planning are going to enhance leaders capabilities to achieve organization effectiveness. However what happens if the theories or ideas are confuse or not effective at particular situation? Will the theories operate and suitable to organization culture? Will the committed theories fail to return expected outcome? Will the theories cause misunderstanding and impact to the operation or organization? How clear do we know the models? How accurate do we see the direction and outcome? This is a general rule that we must learn to get the concept of theories right first and then put into practical effect. This is a lifelong process that leader should c ontinuously learning and provide high level of commitment to understand leadership theories clearer so be more control and more effective of the outcome. Potentially leaders may cause fears and critical impacts if they are confuse or ambiguous about their action and outcome, especially leaders with great power. As Peter Parker quotes in his spider-man stories that With great power comes great responsibility. ASSIGNMENT 2: REFERENCES/BIBLIOGRAPHY Bradford University School of Management, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 20010, 2011, 2012. Managing People (MP) Study Book. David A. Buchanan and AndrzeJ A. Huczynski, Organizational Behavior. 7 Editions. 1985, 2010. Jai B. P. Sinha, Culture and Organizational Behavior, First Published in 2008 by SAGE Publications India Pvt Ltd. Omkar Phatak, Pros and Cons of Leadership Theories. 6/20/2012. Retrieved July 04, 2012, from http://www.buzzle.com/articles/leadership-theories-pros-and-cons.html Right Management Inc. Organizational Effectiveness, 2010. Retrieved July 04, 2012, from http://right.com/thought-leadership/research/organizational-effectiveness-discovering-how-to-make-it-happen.pdf Bolden R. Gosling, J. Marturano, A. and Dennison, P. A review of Leadership Theory and Competency Frameworks, June 2003. Retrieved July 04, 2012, from http://centres.exeter.ac.uk/cls/documents/mgmt_standards.pdf Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Leadership. Retrieved July 04, 2012, from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leadership#Theories The High and the Mighty. Shelton, Ken. Leadership Excellence29. 5 (May 2012): 2. http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.brad.ac.uk/docview/1018673389/137BDADA9D5486776E9/2?accountid=17193 Successful Leaders. Halvorson, Heidi Grant. Leadership Excellence29. 5 (May 2012): 6. http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.brad.ac.uk/docview/1018673393/fulltext/137BDADA9D5486776E9/6?accountid=17193 Real Leaders. Fretwell, Peter. Leadership Excellence29. 5 (May 2012): 8. http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.brad.ac.uk/docview/1018673589/fulltext/137BDADA9D5486776E9/8?accountid=17193

Lord of the Flies :: essays papers

Lord of the Flies Artificial Restraints in Lord of the Flies "GOLDING PUTS SO MANY ARTIFICIAL RESTRAINTS ON HIS STORY IN ORDER TO EMPHASISE HIS POINT, THAT THE WHOLE THING COMES OUT TOO NEATLY AND, IN FACT, REDUCES THE POWER OF HIS MESSAGE." I think that, while the boys experience immense bad luck due to the author, the story still proves its point. It is still possible though, that the bad luck of the boys could have been experienced in real life. I think that without this bad luck, the point of the story wouldn’t be as great, because without the restraint’s Golding placed on the boys, life on the island would have been too easy for the boys. The major constraint that Golding puts on the boys is the personality clash between Jack and Ralph. From the beginning, when Ralph is elected leader, Jack hates Ralph, and towards the end of the book, the feeling becomes mutual. Without Jack and Ralph’s problems, life would have been easy, and the ‘darkness of man’s heart’ would not have been conveyed to the reader. Jack shows ‘the darkness’ and if he and Ralph had just been friends, there would never have been an opportunity for Jack to show this darkness which lurked beneath the surface. Golding also uses the dead pilot conveniently against the boys - the way in which he is caught in the trees just in the right position to be caught by the wind and look like the beast and the way the wind picks up after Simon has let him down from the trees and carries him out to sea, so that the other boys cannot see that it wasn’t a beast. The author uses the boy’s fear against them, and although this could possibly happen in the situation, Golding uses it as a weapon against them, their morale and their companionship. I think that the boys split up and go to Jack because of the fear - he can kill the beast, he can get them meat, and if they ever get upset, he can start a dance and all will be fine.

Communicaton between animals and humans Essay -- essays research paper

INTRODUCTION The importance of communication between animals cannot be underestimated. Through communication, animals are able to concentrate on finding food, avoiding their enemies, mating and caring for their young. The study of communication between animals and humans is a never ending fascination and a way to learn more about ourselves. The development of human communication is what makes us exclusive to any living thing on this planet. The ways in which we communicate with one another is uniquely important in our everyday lives. Without it’s presence, the world would have no development, holding the same appearance as one million years ago. We would be lacking a sense of society and most probably be still in the Stone Age. The mystery of the development of human language constitutes how we are uniquely human from other animals. Human beings have a daily working vocabulary of 1000 words, and with our knowledge on how to use grammatical rules is what makes our sense of communication more sophisticated than any animal. Verbal communication between humans is the central, most relevant factor in a sophisticated society. People have evolved into expressive and capable members of society. The human language has been around for five thousand years and it is apparent that language has been complex long before that. The human language is quite problematic as grammar and syntax play a major role in defining language. Animals have an extremely primitive way of communicating compared to humans, and the way in which we communicate. Animals cannot verbally speak like us humans and studies verify this. HUMAN AND ANIMAL COMMUNICATION It is the existence of human communication that has made the world the place it is today. Through communication, human beings have created skyscrapers, long bridges to complicated forms of transportation. We have also had the ability to start world destruction and encourage world peace. It is through learning how to communicate with other humans for almost five thousand years that a persons way of thinking has expanded and information has been passed on from generation to generation. Without a well-advanced language system, we would not be able to function as a successful society that is constantly making advanced and technological developments. The ways in which we communicate to each ... .... Humans have also been able to build a comfortable society and work at it from generation to generation. As far as we know, animals are still using the same forms of communication as hums did 5000 years ago. There have been no signs of advances in the ways in which they live or the ways they choose to communicate. I don’t underestimate animals as I think they can be intelligent in their own little ways. In conclusion, the only means of animal communication involves a basic information transfer from the sender to the receiver. However, no animal could come close to an affective communication system like the human language. They can however convoy their needs, desires and reactions to the environment via some sophisticated signalling of their own. BIBLEOGRAPHY (1)  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Harley T (1996) â€Å"The psychology of language from Data to Theory†. Psychology press publishers. (2)  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ting-Toomey. S and Korzenny. F (1989) â€Å"Language, Communication, and Culture†. Sage Publications Ltd (Volume X111) (3)  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Wardhaugh. R (1993) â€Å"Investigating Language†. Blackwell publishers.

Air India †the Virgin Airways Saga Essay

In December 1999, India’s national carrier, Air India (A-I) signed an agreement with Virgin Atlantic Airways1 (VA) by which VA would fly three flights on the Delhi-London route on a code-sharing2 basis with A-I. This was hailed as a significant development for the ailing A-I. The code sharing arrangement was expected to trigger off a price war in the Delhi-London route where British Airways (BA) was a dominant player. According to the agreement, VA would fly three more flights a week on this route by 2001. In July 2000, VA started off with two flights a week on Thursdays and Saturdays from Delhi. It planned to have a third flight by October 2000. However, till late 2001, VA was still flying two flights. A-I did not seem ready to allow VA fly the third flight because A-I too had a flight from Delhi on Monday, the day VA wanted to fly from Delhi. Meanwhile, the Government of India (GoI) granted rights to BA to fly three more flights per week from Kolkata to London. This was in violation of the bilateral pact signed between Britain and India according to which BA and A-I were allowed to fly 16 flights a week to each other’s country. BA was already flying 16 flights a week-seven from Delhi, seven from Mumbai and two from Chennai. In late 2001, VA was severely affected by the downturn in the global aviation industry. VA was finding it difficult to sustain its operations in India with only two flights a week. VA had made it clear that unless it was allowed to increase the frequency to three, its exit from India would be a distinct possibility. Background Note A-I was registered as Air India International in 1948. Later in 1962, the word ‘International’ was dropped and from March 1994, the airline began functioning as Air-India Limited. In 2000, A-I’s network covered 44 destinations (Refer Exhibit I). In addition, A-I had a code sharing arrangement with a number of foreign airlines. These included Air France, Swiss Air, Bellview Airlines, Austrian Airlines, Asiana Airlines, Scandinavian Airlines, Singapore Airlines, Aeroflot, Air Mauritius, Kuwait Airways and Emirates. In the late 1990s, as part of its disinvestment rogramme, the GoI decided to divest 40% stake in A-I and began looking for a strategic partner. The strategic partner would take up 40% stake with only a 26% cap to foreign airlines. Ever since it began operations in 1984, VA focused on international routes. After the airlines maiden flight, from London’s Gatwick airport to Newark on the outskirts of New York, Richard Branson3 added several lucrative routes to his kitty. Till 1999, VA’s route network in the Asian region included Heathrow-Tokyo-Heathrow, Heathrow-Hong Kong-Heathrow and Heathrow-Shanghai-Heathrow. The airline had code-share agreements with Continental Airlines, Malaysian Airlines, and British Midland. In |the late 1990s, Branson was targeting the lucrative Delhi-London route. Every year an estimated 0. 3 million passengers traveled from Delhi to London, which was nearly 40 per cent of the total outbound traffic from India. The only available direct route codes were held by BA and A-I. As a result passengers were forced to take circuitous routes |offered by airlines like Emirates and Royal Jordanian which made them wait for hours at distant airports. Branson’s efforts to woo A-I started in 1997. He said, â€Å"Air-India was once famous for its service and I’d like to think that as well as competing with Air-India we can share with it our experience of making Virgin Atlantic the success it is today. † Analysts felt that A-I would learn from VA’s innovation in hospitality. VA was the first airline to offer a TV monitor with every seat (in every class). It offered in-flight beauty therapy including the services of masseurs, ice-cream cones during in-flight movies and a chauffeured motorcycle service to airports. Also in the offing were email and Internet services. Upper class passengers were provided laptop power leads with every seat, and headsets to reduce noise in the cabin. Besides commercial cooperation on cargo services, yield management, and product development, the arrangement with Branson would give AI’s staffers access to cabin crew training. However, analysts felt that once VA started its operations, it would be an all-out fight to lure passengers and AI would be the worst sufferer. As VA promised to offer tickets at 15 per cent less than BA, a Delhi-London VA ticket would be cheaper than A-I’s. The Deal In 1999, the ministry of civil aviation said that it was willing to consider an agreement between VA and A-I that would benefit both carriers. The agreement was to include a code-sharing arrangement or sharing of A-I flight quotas. The entry of VA on the London-India routes was likely to bring down the fares on the sector. In December 1999, VA signed an agreement with A-I to fly three services a week on a code share basis between Delhi and London from July 2000. The arrangement with A-I was for five years and apart from the initial three flights a week, frequencies, it had agreed to give away the remaining three to V-I by 2001. VA and A-I would share seats on each other’s routes and VA would operate flights to the UK on routes not covered by A-I. VA would also fly on days that were not flown by A-I. Under the terms of the agreement, flights would carry both VA and A-I flight numbers, and both airlines would sell seats on those services in competition with one another. Said Branson, â€Å"Launching flights between the UK and India has always been an ambition of mine. It is a very potent route and currently I see a lack of capacity on this route, which has decreased tourist flow between the two countries. I think between the two airlines – Air-India and Virgin – we will be able to improve the route. † According to some analysts, the GoI was interested in forging an alliance with VA because of the group’s interests in entertainment, music telecom, insurance and financial services. Branson had raised hopes of further investments in publishing, holiday homes and telecom. He said, â€Å"This is just the beginning. We will study the Indian market and see what business is best suited for the market and for us and proceed accordingly. We will see where we can make a difference. A-I had been in the red for a long time and was hoping that the VA venture would improve its bottomline. Said Branson, â€Å"We are paying a significant amount to A-I under the code-sharing agreement, though I would not like to reveal the amount. Let me assure you: Air-India can make a few millions. † However, Air India officials felt that more than the financial gains, it was the pa rtnership that mattered and the move would bring in fresh traffic to the country. Besides traffic, VA’s arrival could also mean reductio in airfares. Said Branson, â€Å"Our upper class and premium class as we call them are as competitively priced as the first class and business class fares of other airlines respectively. Except, of course, we give more services such as limousines, manicure, beauty treatment, etc, to every passenger on board. As for our economy class, our priority is to fly it houseful and hence the pricing is whatever it takes to get the customer. Hence, since we will be competing with Air-India too despite this agreement, the pricing and services will be competitive. † VA’s arrival was also expected to improve A-I’s services and even bring about a reduction in the fares depending on the market conditions. Said M. P. Mascarenhas, the then Managing Director of A-I, â€Å"We will have to compete and hence we will have to perform, even if it means fare reduction. † Analysts felt that a possible fare reduction would have an adverse effect on the bottomline of A-I. Responded Mascarenhas, â€Å"I don’t think it would because it would increase traffic and improve the overall situation. You see, now, between the two airlines, there will be services all days of the week. Analysts felt that with the AI-VA code sharing agreement, other carriers such as Thai Airways and Cathay-Pacific, which were asking for more flights, would pressurize the GoI for code-share arrangements with AI in lieu of more flights. Who will Rule the Delhi-London Skies? Analysts felt that with the entry of VA, the Indian skies would see some fierce price wars between VA and BA. Branson said that VA’s first class fares would be equivalent to the business class fares of BA and that the economy fare would be 30-50% cheaper than BA’s. If BA brought down ticket prices as it had done in May 2000, VA would fly for less, Branson said. Since BA had proposed a fare of about Rs 27,000 on the Delhi-London sector, Branson said VA would file an application with the GoI for a lower fare. At the same time, VA would respect the Government’s sentiments on fares, since it was a regulated market, Branson said. In June 2000, VA announced that it would start its operations in India in July with a bi-weekly service-Wednesdays and Fridays from London and Thursdays and Saturdays from Delhi. VA planned to launch a third weekly flight around October. The airline would offer low introductory fares. Mackenzie Grant, VA’s general manager for India said the initial fare was still being worked out and that it would be difficult to give a comparison with competing airlines. Analysts felt that VA would give BA some stiff competition, not only in terms of fares, but also with its array of services such as sleeper seats, massage services and lounge facilities. Said one, â€Å"Virgin’s entry will certainly be a boost to services between India and Europe. The airline has a high quality product. † Branson promised VA fare would be extremely competitive. Analysts felt that competitive pricing would mean that VA would price its Delhi-London flight for less than Rs 25,000, which was approximately the A-I fare. A-I feared there would be an exodus of its already dwindling passenger list. Meanwhile, BA was bracing itself to meet the VA challenge on the Delhi-London sector. The airline announced direct daily services between London and Delhi from October 30, thereby increasing capacity by 25 per cent on this sector. For this, the airline suspended its twice weekly service to Calcutta and terminated its five times-a- week service from Delhi to Dhaka from October 30. The changes were made as part of a renewed bilateral agreement between UK and India signed in February 2000. On July 5, 2000, VA dropped a bombshell. It slashed its introductory airfare from the normal Rs 42,598 to Rs 31,000 for a return ticket on the busy London-Delhi route. But just before VA’s entry into Indian airspace, BA also announced a special economy-class fare: a Rs 27,635 round trip ticket. According to analysts, consumers were at last getting the benefits of a liberalised competitive sector. In July 2000, BA won the right to three more flights per week between India and Britain, drawing an immediate protest from VA. According to BA’s South Asia manager Alan Briggs, under a special arrangement outside a bilateral aviation agreement, the GoI had given BA permission to fly three times a week to the eastern city of Calcutta. Under the bilateral pact, which was renewed in February 2000, BA and A-I were each allowed to fly 16 times a week to each other’s home country. A-I used 10 of its 16 weekly flight entitlements on the route. BA used all 16 of its flight entitlements, with seven flights a week to Delhi, seven to Mumbai and two to Madras. BA had been lobbying since 1993 to increase the number of its flights to India. The End of the Honeymoon? By October 2000, VA was to start its third code share flight as per the agreement with A-I. In addition to the Rs 100 million per flight per annum that A-I got from VA, the third flight would fetch A-I Rs 300 million per annum. However, till late 2001, VA was flying only two flights a week. Also, there was no progress on the remaining three flights that VA was entitled to fly from 2001. This seemed to the bone of contention between VA and A-I. VA officials were particularly unhappy that BA was granted rights to fly three additional flights per week from Kolkata to London against the prevailing norms. What seemed particularly strange was that there was no commercial agreement or code share for any of these additional frequencies. Commenting on the GoI’s interest in BA, a leading business magazine in India wrote, â€Å"The needle of suspicion automatically points to vested interests in the ministry and their sudden penchant for BA. â€Å"5 By December 2000, it became clear that VA would have to wait a bit longer for final clearance from A-I to commence the third code-share |flight on the India-London sector. While VA officials claimed that they would start the third code-share flight within a reasonable period of time following clearances from Indian authorities, A-I officials said that nothing was in the offing as yet. Said a VA official, â€Å"The ball is in the court of A-I and the Indian Government. The day we get the permission, we will start the service in a reasonable time period, which will allow us to relocate aircraft and crew to commence the third flight. Further, the airline will be only too happy to serve other destinations in India. † Some analysts said that while VA was keen to operate the third flight on Sundays from London with a Monday departure from Delhi, A-I was opposed to as the Indian carrier also had a Delhi to London flight on Monday morning. VA was willing to schedule its flight at 2 p. m. in the afternoon, ensuring a gap of more than 6 hours between its flight and A-I’s London flight. But this was not acceptable to A-I, which pointed out that according to the agreement signed between VA, and A-I, VA was to operate flights only on those days when A-I did not operate services to London. A VA official said that the delay in granting permission to VA to operate the third flight on the sector was proving to be financially disastrous for A-I. However, despite these problems, VA said it was interested in code sharing with A-I to other cities such as Chennai, Bangalore, Hyderabad and Ahmedabad. In late 2001, VA was in some trouble because of the downturn in the transatlantic aviation business and shrinking revenues. VA announced 20 per cent reduction in operations, grounded five of its aircraft and pruned the workforce by 1200 to tide over one of the worst crises for the international aviation business in the aftermath of the US attacks6. Having already announced 20 per cent reduction of activities, the airline seemed unable to sustain its operations in India with just two |flights a week. Said Paul Smitton, general manager-India, VA, â€Å"Two flights each from Delhi is not a viable proposition in the long run. At least three or more flights makes the business viable as it would enable us to get more traffic and meet economies of scale from our operations here. † He added, â€Å"No airline can sustain loss making regions for long. And this time round, we will wait for just months and not |years before taking a decision. † Analysts felt that VA was likely to review its strategy for its fledgling unprofitable Indian operations. |During its short stay in India, VA had already notched up losses on the Delhi-London sector and industry sources ruled out the chances of VA breaking even unless the frequency increased from the current level. VA officials have indicated to the GoI that VA may have to pull out of India if the frequency of operations was not increased. VA informed the GoI that it had agreed to provide A-I with income worth Rs 100 million per annum for each flight on the basis of the understanding that a third frequency would be allowed on schedule. VA also said that it had hired Indian crew for three flights and spent on publicity, as it was confident its frequency would be increased. It informed the GoI that it would have to pull out of India if the third flight was not cleared. In October 2001, the GoI ordered a full review of the code-sharing pact. What remained to be seen was whether the much-hyped I-A-VA alliance would be sustainable in the long run

Managing Organisational Change

International Journal of Public Sector Management Emerald Article: Managing organisational change in the public sector Lessons from the privatisation of the Property Service Agency Ron Coram, Bernard Burnes Article information: To cite this document: Ron Coram, Bernard Burnes, (2001),†Managing organisational change in the public sector – Lessons from the privatisation of the Property Service Agency†, International Journal of Public Sector Management, Vol. 14 Iss: 2 pp. 94 – 110 Permanent link to this document: http://dx. doi. org/10. 108/09513550110387381 Downloaded on: 17-01-2013 References: This document contains references to 56 other documents Citations: This document has been cited by 14 other documents To copy this document: [email  protected] com This document has been downloaded 4884 times since 2005. * Users who downloaded this Article also downloaded: * Ron Coram, Bernard Burnes, (2001),†Managing organisational change in the public sector à ¢â‚¬â€œ Lessons from the privatisation of the Property Service Agency†, International Journal of Public Sector Management, Vol. 4 Iss: 2 pp. 94 – 110 http://dx. doi. org/10. 1108/09513550110387381 Ron Coram, Bernard Burnes, (2001),†Managing organisational change in the public sector – Lessons from the privatisation of the Property Service Agency†, International Journal of Public Sector Management, Vol. 14 Iss: 2 pp. 94 – 110 http://dx. doi. org/10. 1108/09513550110387381 Ron Coram, Bernard Burnes, (2001),†Managing organisational change in the public sector – Lessons from the privatisation of the Property Service Agency†, International Journal of Public Sector Management, Vol. 4 Iss: 2 pp. 94 – 110 http://dx. doi. org/10. 1108/09513550110387381 Access to this document was granted through an Emerald subscription provided by Edinburgh Napier University For Authors: If you would like to write for this, or any other Emerald publication, then please use our Emerald for Authors service. Information about how to choose which publication to write for and submission guidelines are available for all. Please visit www. emeraldinsight. com/authors for more information. About Emerald www. emeraldinsight. om With over forty years' experience, Emerald Group Publishing is a leading independent publisher of global research with impact in business, society, public policy and education. In total, Emerald publishes over 275 journals and more than 130 book series, as well as an extensive range of online products and services. Emerald is both COUNTER 3 and TRANSFER compliant. The organization is a partner of the Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE) and also works with Portico and the LOCKSS initiative for digital archive preservation. *Related content and download information correct at time of download.The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at http://www. emerald-library. com/ft IJPSM 1 4,2 94 Lessons from the privatisation of the Property Service Agency Manchester School of Management, UMIST, Manchester, UK Keywords Organizational change, Public sector management, Privatization, Government agencies, Public authority assets Abstract Whilst organisational change appears to be happening with increasing frequency and magnitude in both the public and private sectors, most of the major studies of change focus on the private sector and tend to derive their approaches to change from that sector.From a review of the literature, it is argued that there is no â€Å"one best way† to manage organisational change but that public sector organisations need to adopt an approach to change which matches their needs and situation. The article examines the privatisation of the Property Services Agency (PSA) in order to draw lessons as to how the public sector can and should manage change. It is shown that the privatisation was characterised by a lack of clarity, an over-emphasi s on changes to structures and procedures, and staff resistance.However, underpinning this was an inappropriate approach to change. The article concludes that the main lessons of the PSA's privatisation are that, in such circumstances, it is necessary to adopt an approach to change which incorporates both the structural and cultural aspects of change, and which recognises the need to appreciate and respond to staff fears and concerns. Managing organisational change in the public sector Ron Coram and Bernard Burnes The International Journal of Public Sector Management, Vol. 14 No. 2, 2001, pp. 94-110. MCB University Press, 0951-3558 Introduction From Kurt Lewin's work in the 1940s to the present day, organisational change, as a systematic process, has moved from being a topic of interest to only a few academics and practitioners to one that is seen as lying at the core of organisational life (Senior, 1997; Stickland, 1998). However, whilst organisational change appears to be happenin g with increasing frequency and magnitude in both the public and private sectors, most of the major studies of and approaches to change  ± with some notable exceptions (e. g.Pettigrew et al. , 1992)  ± focus on the private sector and tend to derive their approaches to change from that sector (e. g. Kanter et al. , 1992; Kotter, 1996; Mabey and Mayon-White, 1993; Pettigrew, 1985; Smith, 1997). Not only does this underplay the enormous changes which have taken place and are continuing to take place in the public sector, but it also ignores the need to develop approaches to change which are in tune with the circumstances in which public service organisations now find themselves (Flynn and Williams, 1997; Salauroo and Burnes, 1998).Though there have been some well-publicised examples of public sector change projects which have gone badly wrong (Brindle, 1999), there is no evidence to show that public sector managers are, inherently, any less capable of managing change than their pri vate sector counterparts (Ferlie et al. , 1996). However, the challenges they face are different from those of their private sector counterparts, especially in terms of public accountability, demonstrating value for money, and in meeting the increasing expectations, regarding service levels and quality, of both the general public and politicians.Over the last 20 years, one of the most significant challenges that public sector managers have had to cope with, and one which has taken them into unknown territory, has been that the boundary between the public and private sector has become increasingly hazy (Crouch and Streeck, 1997; Flynn, 1993). In the UK, which has tended to be at the forefront of these developments, some public services, or parts of them, have been and are being put out to private tender (e. g. he management of some schools and local education authorities); in other cases, public bodies have been turned into quasi-independent organisations (e. g. the Benefits Agency); and, in other instances, some organisations have been and are being privatised in their entirety (e. g. public utilities). All these forms of organisational change throw up their own dilemmas and challenges, and they all require an approach to change which is appropriate to the circumstances involved. However, as Dunphy and Stace (1993) argued, there is no one approach which is suitable for all circumstances and objectives.This article examines one particular and major form of organisational change which continues to have a large impact on the public sector: privatisation. It focuses upon the Property Services Agency (PSA) which, until its privatisation in the early 1990s, was responsible for the construction, maintenance and management of all the UK government's buildings and property. By presenting a case study of the privatisation of the PSA, the article seeks to draws lessons as to how the public sector can and should manage change.The article begins by reviewing the literature on change management. In particular, it draws attention to the need to recognise that there is no â€Å"one best way† to manage organisational change. This is followed by a description of the background to our research on the PSA, and the presentation of the case study itself. As the subsequent discussion section shows, the privatisation of the PSA was characterised by a lack of clarity, an over-emphasis on changes to structures and procedures, and staff resistance.Underpinning this was an inappropriate approach to change. In conclusion, the article argues that the main lessons of the PSA's privatisation are that, in such circumstances, there is a need to adopt an approach to change which balances the structural and cultural aspects of change, especially the need to appreciate and respond to staff fears and concerns. Approaches to change management As Stickland (1998, p. 14) remarks: F F Fthe problem with studying change is that it parades across many subject domains under u merous guises, such as transformation, development, metamorphosis, transmutation, evolution, regeneration, innovation, revolution and transition to name but a few. Organisational change in the public sector 95 IJPSM 14,2 96 Especially over the last 20 years or so, as the pace and magnitude of organisational change appears to have accelerated, there has been a significant increase in the number of approaches to change management on offer (see Buchanan and Boddy, 1992; Buchanan and Storey, 1997; Burnes, 2000; Cummings and Worley, 1997; Dawson, 1994; Kanter et al. 1992; Pettigrew et al. , 1992; Senior, 1997; Stace and Dunphy, 1994; Stickland, 1998; Wilson, 1992). Nevertheless, most writers tend to fall into one of two broad camps: those who support the Planned approach to change and those who espouse the Emergent approach. The Planned approach originated in the 1940s from the work of Kurt Lewin (Lewin, 1947). Subsequently, it was adopted by, and became the central focus of, the Organiz ation Development (OD) movement (French and Bell, 1995).However, in the 1980s, as a result of increasing criticism of the Planned approach, the Emergent approach to change came to the fore. Its proponents argued that the Emergent approach was more suitable for the dynamic and unpredictable conditions faced by organisations in the late twentieth century. The following briefly examines, and attempts to put into perspective, both these approaches to change in order to prepare the ground for presenting and discussing the privatisation of the PSA.Planned change: summary and criticisms Planned change is an iterative, cyclical, process involving diagnosis, action and evaluation, and further action and evaluation. It is an approach which maintains that once change has taken place, it must be self-sustaining (i. e. safe from regression). The purpose of Planned change is to improve the effectiveness of the human side of the organisation by focusing on the performance of groups and teams. Cent ral to Planned change is the stress placed on the collaborative nature of the hange effort: the organisation, managers, recipients of change and change agents jointly diagnose the organisation's problem and jointly plan and design the specific changes. Underpinning Planned change, and indeed the origins of the OD movement as a whole, is a strong humanist and democratic orientation and an emphasis on improving organisational effectiveness. The main criticisms levelled against the Planned approach to change are, as Burnes and Salauroo (1995) point out, as follows.First, Planned change was developed specifically for, and in response to, topdown, autocratic, rigid, rule-based organisations operating in a somewhat predictable and controlled environment. However, an increasing number of writers argue that, in the turbulent and chaotic world in which we live, such assumptions are increasingly tenuous and that organisational change is more a continuous and open-ended process than a set of d iscrete and self-contained events (Garvin, 1993; Hatch, 1997; Nonaka, 1988; Peters, 1989; Stacey, 1993; Wooten and White, 1999).Second, and on a similar note, a number of writers have criticised the Planned approach for its emphasis on incremental and isolated change, and its inability to incorporate radical, transformational change (Dunphy and Stace, 1993; Harris, 1985; Miller and Friesen, 1984; Schein, 1985). Third, Planned change is based on the assumption that common agreement can be reached, and that all the parties involved in a particular change project have a willingness and interest in doing so.This assumption appears to ignore organisational conflict and politics, or at least assumes that problem issues can be easily identified and resolved. However, as Pfeffer (1981; 1992) showed, conflict and personal and group self-interest do play an important role in what changes take place and who benefits from them. Fourth, it assumes that one type of approach to change is suitable for all organisations, all situations and all times. Dunphy and Stace (1993, p. 905), on the other hand, argue that: Turbulent times demand different responses in varied circumstances.So managers and consultants need a model of change that is essentially a â€Å"situational† or â€Å"contingency model†, one that indicates how to vary change strategies to achieve â€Å"optimum fit† with the changing environment. Organisational change in the public sector 97 Leading OD advocates, as might be expected, dispute these criticisms and point to the way that Planned change has tried to incorporate issues such as power and politics and the need for organisational transformation (Cummings and Worley, 1997; French and Bell, 1995).Nevertheless, as criticisms of the Planned approach mounted, supporters of the Emergent approach gained ground. Emergent change: summary and criticisms There are many writers who have contributed to the development of the Emergent approach, notably Dawson (1994), Kanter et al. (1992), Kotter (1996), Pettigrew (1985) and Wilson (1992). Unlike the supporters of the Planned approach, the main proponents of the Emergent approach are a much more diverse group who are separated by both geographic and disciplinary divides. Nevertheless, they would, more or less, agree that the main tenets of Emergent change are as follows: .Organisational change is a continuous process of experiment and adaptation aimed at matching an organisation's capabilities to the needs and dictates of a dynamic and uncertain environment. . Though this is best achieved through a multitude of (mainly) small- to medium-scale incremental changes, over time these can lead to a major re-configuration and transformation of an organisation. . Change is a multi-level, cross-organisation process that unfolds in an iterative and messy fashion over a period of years and comprises a series of interlocking projects. . Change is a political-social process and not an analytic al-rational one. The role of managers is not to plan or implement change per se, but to create or foster an organisational structure and climate which encourages and sustains experimentation, learning and risk-taking, and IJPSM 14,2 . 98 . to develop a workforce that will take responsibility for identifying the need for change and implementing it. Although managers are expected to become facilitators rather than doers, they also have the prime responsibility for developing a collective vision or common purpose which gives direction to their organisation, and within which the appropriateness of any proposed change can be judged.The key organisational activities which allow these elements to operate successfully are: information-gathering  ± about the external environment and internal objectives and capabilities; communication  ± the transmission, analysis and discussion of information; and learning  ± the ability to develop new skills, identify appropriate responses and draw kn owledge from their own and others' past and present actions. Though not always stated explicitly, the case for an Emergent approach to change is based on the assumption that all organisations operate in a turbulent, dynamic and unpredictable environment.Therefore, if the external world is changing in a rapid and uncertain way, organisations need to be continuously scanning their environment in order to identify developments and respond appropriately. Though ultimately leading to organisational transformation, to be successful, it is argued, change needs to emerge locally and incrementally in order to respond to threats and opportunities thrown up by environmental instability. Because this is a continuous, open-ended and bottom-up process, the Planned approach to change is inappropriate.This leads to the first of three major criticisms of the Emergent approach: it is specifically founded on the assumption that all organisations operate in a dynamic environment which requires continuo us transformation. It is, by its own definition, not applicable to organisations operating in stable environments where fine-tuning is the order of the day, or those whose circumstances require major changes through the use of rapid and coercive measures.The second criticism relates to the difference between these two approaches. The Planned approach is attacked because of its advocacy of â€Å"Refreezing† organisations after they have been changed (Kanter et al. , 1992). However, if one examines the process of change advocated by, for example, Dawson (1994), Kotter (1996) and Pettigrew et al. (1992), though they argue to the contrary, they do speak of change as a â€Å"transition† process which does have a beginning, middle and end. Indeed, as Hendry (1996, p. 24) comments: Scratch any account of creating and managing change and the idea that change is a threestage process which necessarily begins with a process of unfreezing will not be far below the surface. The fin al criticism concerns the emphasis that advocates of the Emergent approach place on the political and cultural aspects of change. Though undoubtedly politics and culture do play a role in the change process, a number of writers have begun to criticise what they regard as the overemphasis placed on these aspects of change. Hendry (1996, p. 21), for example, argues that: â€Å"The management of change has become F F F overfocused on the political aspects of change†, whilst Collins (1998, p. 100), voicing concerns of his own and of other researchers, argues that: F F F in reacting to the problems and critiques of [the Planned approach], managers and practitioners have swung from a dependence on under-socialized models and explanations of change and instead have become committed to the arguments of, what might be called, oversocialized models of change. Organisational change in the public sector 99Therefore, though it has apparent advantages over the Planned approach, or rather i t is applicable to situations for which Planned change is not suitable, an examination of the Emergent approach reveals that it not free from serious criticism. Putting change into perspective In examining the Planned and Emergent approaches to change, what we can see is that they focus on different aspects of organisations and are applicable to different situations. The Planned approach is primarily aimed at improving group effectiveness, tends to have a top-down orientation and is most suitable for stable environments.The Emergent approach, on the other hand, tends to focus on organisational transformation through continuous change and seems more suited to turbulent environments. This means that, despite their other strengths and weaknesses, both are essentially situational approaches: suitable only for particular situations. In addition, it is also clear that, even taken together, the two approaches do not cover all the broad spectrum of change events which organisations encounte r. Senior (1997), for example, rawing on the work of Grundy (1993), identifies three categories of change: â€Å"smooth incremental†  ± covering slow, systematic, evolutionary change; â€Å"bumpy incremental†  ± pertaining to periods where the smooth flow of change accelerates; and â€Å"discontinuous change†. Cummings and Worley (1997) identify a continuum running from incremental change to quantum change. Dunphy and Stace (1992), in a similar but more detailed way, identify a four-stage change continuum that comprises: fine-tuning, incremental adjustment, modular transformation and corporate transformation.Storey (1992) offers a four-fold typology of change: (1) Top-down systemic change. This is aimed at transforming the organisation. (2) Piecemeal initiatives. These are devised and implemented by departments or sections in an unconnected fashion. (3) Bargaining for change. This is where a series of targets are jointly agreed between managers and workers, but are pursued in a piecemeal fashion. (4) Systemic jointism. This is where managers and workers agree a total package of changes designed to achieve organisational transformation.IJPSM 14,2 100 Kanter et al. (1992), addressing the issue of transformational change, have noted that it can be achieved either by a Bold Stroke approach (rapid overall change) or a Long March approach (incremental change leading to transformation over an extended period of time). In a similar vein, Beer and Nohria (2000) make an interesting contribution to the change debate. Based on over 40 years of studying the nature of corporate change, they identify two basic archetypes, or theories of change: Theory E and Theory O.The main objective of Theory E change is to maximise shareholder value. It is applied in situations where an organisation's performance has diminished to such an extent that its main shareholders demand major and rapid change to improve the organisation's financial performance. Typically this is a â€Å"hard† approach based on downsizing, divestment of non-core or low-performing businesses, and the heavy use of financial incentives. Theory O, on the other hand, is also aimed at improving an organisation's performance but his is more a â€Å"soft† approach which is based on developing the organisation's culture and its human capabilities, and promoting organisational learning. Beer and Nohria (2000) believe that both of these are valid models of change but that both have their flaws. Theory E can achieve short-term financial gains but at the cost of denuding an organisation of the human capabilities and organisational culture necessary for long-term survival. Theory O, whilst focusing on these, falls into the trap of not restructuring to concentrate on core activities, thus failing to deliver shareholder value.To achieve the gains of both these approaches, whilst avoiding the pitfalls, Beer and Nohria advocate using these in tandem by focusing on the ra pid restructuring elements of Theory E but following this with the human capability development offered by Theory O. Although similar to Kanter et al. ‘s (1992) â€Å"Bold Strokes† and â€Å"Long March†, this idea goes beyond most other writers by pointing out that it is possible and sometimes necessary to combine approaches to change, rather than arguing for some sort of universal approach.In concluding this review of the literature on organisational change, three issues need to be emphasised, which are as follows: (1) There are a wide variety of approaches to change, though some tend to be more popular than others. (2) As Burnes (1996) argues, there is no â€Å"one best way† to manage change. All the approaches on offer appear to be situational, i. e. limited in terms of the circumstances in which they are effective. Therefore, managers need to choose an approach which is suitable for their situation rather than assuming that what worked in the past will also work in the future. 3) In some situations, it may be necessary to combine, either concurrently or sequentially, different approaches to change. Having identified the main issues with regard to the literature on change, we can now proceed to examine how the PSA managed change in practice. This will commence with a brief description of the background to our research, and the methods employed. Background and methods This article is based on research carried out between 1995 and 1998 by the authors into the process and consequences of the privatisation of the Property Services Agency.The research had two main objectives: (1) To identify the reasons for, and the process of, the privatisation of the PSA. (2) Post-privatisation, to examine the impact of the new arrangements on relations between government departments and the newly-privatised PSA. As mentioned in the Introduction, this article is concerned with the first objective, the process of privatisation. For a review of the imp act of privatisation on relations between government departments and the privatised PSA, see Burnes and Coram (1999).Looking at the design of the research and the methods used to study the changes at the PSA, the aim of the research was to construct a mainly qualitative case study of what took place. This was based on principles and methods of research advocated by writers such as Denzin and Lincoln (1998), Robson (1993) and Yin (1994). Though documentary evidence was collected, such as press reports, extracts from parliamentary debates, internal PSA documents and the National Audit Office reports into the sale of the PSA (NAO, 1995; 1996), the main source of data came from interviews with those most closely involved with the process.These fell into five groups: (1) Senior civil servants within the responsible for managing and privatising the PSA. (2) Senior civil servants responsible for managing and procuring property and property services for government departments. (3) Senior ci vil servants in the bodies responsible for advising departments on purchasing policy. (4) Directors and operational staff in the privatised companies, the majority of whom were former PSA employees. (5) The Civil Service trade unions involved in the privatisation negotiations.In total, some 50 individuals were interviewed. The interviews were taperecorded and transcripts sent to the interviewees for checking and correction. In addition, a draft of the final report of the research was sent to the interviewees for comment. These data formed the basis of the following description of the privatisation process. Organisational change in the public sector 101 IJPSM 14,2 102 The privatisation of the Property Services Agency (PSA) Background The origins of the PSA can be traced to 1962 when the Ministry of PublicBuildings and Works was made responsible for maintaining all the UK government's civil buildings. A year later, the Ministry was merged with the Works Directorates of the Admiralty, War Office and Air Ministry. The merger increased the Ministry's workforce to over 60,000. With the creation of the Department of the Environment (DoE) in 1970, it was decided that the responsibility for construction and maintenance services should become the responsibility of a separate agency and thus the Property Services Agency was born.Its role was to: F F F provide, manage, maintain, and furnish the property used by the government, including defence establishments, offices, courts, research laboratories, training centres and land (PSA, 1988, inside cover). In the 1960s and 1970s, few questioned whether or not such activities were best carried out by the public sector, but in the 1980s the tide of opinion began to turn (Crouch and Streeck, 1997). Claims of bureaucratic inefficiency and waste in the UK public services were nothing new (Chapman, 1978; Fulton, 1968; Plowden, 1961).However, what was new, with the election of Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister in 1979, was that tac kling â€Å"bloated, wasteful, overbureaucratic, and underperforming† public services became the centrepiece of government policy (Ferlie et al. , 1996, p. 11). Subsequently, successive Conservative governments attempted to deliver better value for money in public services through measures such as privatisation, outsourcing and compulsory competitive tendering (Flynn, 1993; Horton, 1996).Not surprisingly, given its size and importance, but most of all given the fact that it seemed to be carrying out a role that in other sectors of the economy was carried out by the private sector, the PSA became a prime target for reform. The process of privatisation In retrospect, it is possible to see that the process of privatising the PSA went through six key stages and began well in advance of the actual announcement that it was to be privatised: . Stage 1.In order to increase the commercial efficiency of the PSA, in 1986 the government appointed the consultancy firm Deloitte to develop and introduce new accounting and management information systems. These new systems were designed to allow the PSA to operate along private sector lines and to abandon public sector practices which were seen as uncommercial. . Stage 2. In 1987, it was announced that, from April 1988, civilian departments of government could take responsibility for commissioning their own construction projects with a value of over ? 150,000.The Ministry of Defence was allowed to follow suit in April 1990. In effect, . . . . this meant that the PSA was going to have to bid alongside private sector companies for government work. Stage 3. In 1988, the Secretary of State for the Environment announced that the PSA would in future operate on a commercial basis. This is to say that its income, and indeed its survival, would depend on gaining work from government departments in the face of private sector competition. To facilitate this, the PSA was restructured into a number of separate business functions.In addition, in order to promote a more commercial orientation, a Business Development Directorate was established within the PSA. The consultants Price Waterhouse were appointed to operate alongside the new Directorate to assist the PSA's commercial development by, among other things, training staff in business accounting, financial management, business planning, people management, customer care and marketing. Stage 4. In September 1989, the government announced that the PSA was to be privatised.In June 1990, the legislation necessary to enable this to take place was passed. Stage 5. In October 1990, in preparation for privatisation, the PSA was restructured into three main businesses: PSA Projects, PSA Building Management (which was eventually split into five separate companies), and PSA International (which, in the end, was closed down rather than sold). Stage 6. PSA Projects was privatised in 1992. This was followed in 1993 by the sale of the five companies which comprised PSA Buil ding Management. Organisational change in the public sector 103The above presents the privatisation of the PSA as a relatively straightforward and well-planned process. However, this is far from the reality of what happened. First, it must be recognised that most of the above actions were imposed on the PSA rather than arising from the decisions of its own management. Second, the six stages focused very much on changes to structures and procedures whilst paying little attention to the need for attitudinal, behavioural and cultural changes or, indeed, the reaction of the PSA's staff to the notion of privatisation.Finally, as the following will explain, the move to privatise the PSA was far slower and much messier than either the government or the PSA's management had allowed for. The pace of privatisation As the following quotation from a director of one of the privatised companies indicates, the privatisation of the PSA took longer, and was more difficult, than expected: The privati sation process was a very lengthy process.It was much longer than it was originally intended to be and meant that the natural unease and nervousness that occurs during such periods was prolonged. IJPSM 14,2 104 The main reasons for this slowness were twofold. Lack of strategic direction. At first, the PSA's Board appeared to treat privatisation as a standard public sector change programme which could be planned in advance, executed in a straightforward way with few unforeseen problems, and which staff would accept, even if they did not like it. However, this proved to be far from the case.The PSA's Board brought in a firm of consultants to help them to clarify the PSA's strategic direction but, as this remark by PSA's then Deputy Chief Executive demonstrates, the result seemed somewhat unfocused: For example, we did a lot of work on objectives. I don't think I can remember what we boiled it down to in the end, F F F something like: to preserve the maximum number of viable longterm j obs. Whatever the merits or not of the work the Board did, the middle and lower reaches of the PSA seemed more alarmed than consoled by developments.It was also the case that even where positive decisions were taken by the top, such as a commitment to provide retraining and outplacement support for staff, they found it difficult to put them into practice. One former PSA Director stated that: There were a few things like that [the training] where I think the best intentions at the top were weakened by people underneath, and I didn't know why. The difficulties faced by top management in developing a new strategy for the PSA and in pushing forward the pace of privatisation were threefold.The first was that though, as civil servants, they had been brought up in a stable environment which operated by well-understood rules, they found themselves having to transform the organisation into a commercial entity that could be successful whilst not understanding the nature of competition nor eve r feeling in control of the pace of change. The second was that, having been used to running a bureaucratic organisation with compliant staff, they found themselves attempting to construct a more flexible and entrepreneurial body with an increasingly disgruntled and worried workforce.The last was that, their actions were being dictated and judged by their political masters, whose sole concern appeared to be to privatise the PSA as quickly as possible, no matter what it cost or who was offended. Therefore, senior managers found themselves caught between the politicians' desire for speed and their staff's desire for job security, both of which clashed with their own cautious and ruledriven approach to change. Resistance by PSA employees. This was the second main reason for the slowness of the privatisation process.The majority of PSA employees did not want their organisation privatised. Not only did they value the stability and certainty that working for a government body gave them, b ut also most believed that the PSA had little chance of survival in the private sector. As one of their trade union officials put it: The implications of privatisation for staff, in respect of pensions, severance terms, general pay and conditions, were enormous. What happens if the organisation who took them over went bust at some later date?The result of this uncertainty and fear for their future was that staff sought to resist and delay privatisation. On an individual basis, many staff resisted by withholding information and slowing down the process wherever possible. For example, some staff basically gave up work and devoted all their time to searching for another job, whilst others fabricated rumours. There was also a general increase in union militancy. On a collective basis, the PSA staff trade union decided to oppose the privatisation.As one union official commented: F F F we felt and still feel that if you are providing a service for the public sector and using taxpayers' mo ney, that it's quite inappropriate to have this work carried out by organisations making a profit. Organisational change in the public sector 105 The official also went on to state that it was union policy to delay the privatisation: F F F the idea was that the longer it took, the longer people were in the public sector.There were issues about information, about negotiation over what the implications of the sale would be for staff, and obviously, from that point of view, the idea of slowing the process down wasn't one that we were objecting to. Eventually this resistance became overt and staff took industrial action, including working to rule and strikes. In a belated attempt to defuse staff opposition to privatisation, the government devised a staff choice scheme whereby PSA staff could choose to transfer fully to the privatised companies, to be seconded to them for a limited period, or to take early retirement.The staff choice scheme also protected employees' pension entitlements. Though this defused some of the opposition, it was not until after the 1992 General Election, when many people  ± mistakenly as it turned out  ± expected a change of government, that staff finally accepted the inevitability of privatisation. As can be seen, the PSA's privatisation was characterised overall by uncertainty, delay and a lack of any clear strategic direction (other than to privatise it). The entire process was driven by one unquestionable aim: privatisation.The process, cost and consequences of privatisation were all subordinate, and, in some senses, irrelevant to achieving that one aim. Though clear in itself, the aim provided no guidance as to how it was to be achieved nor, importantly, did it offer any direction for what was to take place afterwards. As for the PSA's strategy, instead of clarity and purpose, what developed was a stream of unplanned, ad hoc and muddled decisions made in reaction to events, rather than in anticipation of them.Discussion Though it is not the purpose of this article to evaluate the merits or otherwise of the decision to privatise the PSA, it is important to recognise that the wave of privatisation seen in the UK in the 1980s and 1990s was essentially based on a IJPSM 14,2 106 political belief that the private sector, driven by competitive pressures, was far better at delivering value-for-money services than the public sector (Crouch and Streeck, 1997; Ferlie et al. , 1996; Flynn, 1993).Consequently, the privatisation of the PSA, like other privatisations, was not driven by some form of rationaleconomic decision-making process, but by a political agenda aimed at transferring parts of the public sector to the private sector. Consequently, successive governments were less concerned with the process of change, or indeed its cost, than with ensuring that the transfer took place. It is not surprising, then, that the PSA's staff should have felt resentment and a sense of betrayal that, after many years of public serv ice, their careers and livelihoods were threatened by what appeared to them to be ideological dogma.This put the senior managers of the PSA in a situation for which they were ill-prepared and had little experience. They had to plan for, and get staff to comply with, a proposition for which they themselves seemed to have little sympathy and over which, in the final analysis, they felt they had little control. To achieve privatisation, they attempted to apply the sort of rational-planned approach to change which had worked for them when undertaking change in the past. But past changes had been undertaken within a relatively stable public sector environment, with a compliant workforce and with few potential losers.Unfortunately, the government's policy in this instance was driven by mainly ideology rather than rationality. It was designed to remove the PSA from the public sector, the workforce were afraid and hostile, rather than compliant, and there were a great number of potential lo sers. It was also the case that the senior echelons of the PSA appeared themselves to be apprehensive and lacking in support for the privatisation. Therefore, not surprisingly, senior managers found it difficult to devise and put their plans into practice when faced with an uncertain environment and a hostile staff.As time passed, three factors came to the fore which ensured that privatisation was completed: (1) In order to achieve its objective of privatising the PSA, the government eventually recognised it would need to be pragmatic as to how this was achieved and its cost. (2) The PSA management abandoned its planned approach to change and, basically, adopted a reactive and ad hoc approach to overcoming the barriers to privatisation  ± dealing with them as they arose and being prepared to be flexible in most aspects of the process. 3) After the 1992 General Election produced no change of government or policy, it became clear to staff that the privatisation of the PSA was inevit able. As can be seen, in terms of strategic change, this was an instance where there was a clear, though limited, objective, but no clear or consistent strategy for achieving it. It is highly debatable whether or not the privatisation of the PSA has produced any measurable benefits to the UK taxpayer. Certainly the government's own National Audit Commission (NAO, 1995; 1996) was critical of the cost and process of the PSA's privatisation.Also, whilst most organisations in the private sector appear convinced that closer, less hostile and longer-term working relationships between customers and suppliers are the way to achieve best value for money, this does not seem to be the case in terms of the public sector's relations with the privatised PSA or other companies in the construction industry (Burnes and Coram, 1999). As far as change management was concerned, what we can see is that the PSA's managers attempted to apply the sort of quick, top-down, mechanistic approach to change whic h had previously worked well in the relatively stable world of the public sector.However, the PSA was moving into unknown territory, the private sector, which was far more dynamic and unpredictable than it was used to. Also, it needed to achieve two forms of change at the same time: changes to structures, practices and procedures; and changes to attitudes, behaviour and culture. Whilst the traditional top-down public sector approach might be suitable to the former, provided the environment was relatively stable, it was not suitable to the latter, regardless of the nature of the environment.This meant that the PSA's leaders were attempting to take their staff into unknown territory, using an inappropriate approach and in a direction with which even they were apparently ill at ease. Conclusions As the literature review argued, there is no â€Å"one best way† to manage change. Just because an approach was deemed appropriate and worked over a period of time does not mean it will work in all situations or for all time (Burnes, 1996). A top-down, planned approach may well be suitable for a stable, public sector bureaucracy, but if a need arises to move the same bureaucracy into the private sector, the same approach is unlikely to work.As Dunphy and Stace (1993, p. 905) remarked: â€Å"Turbulent times demand different responses F F F† Although the privatisation of the PSA is now a past event, the nature of the public sector and whether further elements of it should be privatised, or required to become more market-orientated, still form part of the current political agenda in most countries. Consequently, the lessons of the PSA's privatisation are still very relevant to those who make public policy and to those charged with carrying out the changes which such policies require of them. The main lessons are as follows.First, to prepare services for privatisation, or to operate on a more commercial basis, requires both structural and cultural change. As All aire and Firsirotu (1984) showed, to achieve both requires different approaches with different timescales. A similar point was made by Beer and Nohria (2000), cited earlier, who call for a combination of Theory E and Theory O approaches to achieve such transformations. To focus on only one of these, as was the case with the PSA, is unlikely to achieve the benefits which policy makers expect, and taxpayers increasingly demand. Organisational change in the public sector 107IJPSM 14,2 108 Second, there is a need to win over staff, or at the very least to address their concerns and fears. A key element in this is the need for policy makers to move beyond basing their decisions mainly on dogma or political creed, and instead, as O'Toole and Jordan (1995, p. 190) recommend, to base them upon â€Å"a rigorous identification of weaknesses and a considered plan to remedy those defects†. As far as the PSA case was concerned, there was never really any attempt to win over staff or, unti l quite late in the process, to address their fears and concerns.The main reason for this was that the PSA's senior managers did not know how to promote a decision based on dogma, one which they had played no part in developing, and over whose consequences they had significant reservations. Third, it should also be noted that the PSA's management themselves did not possess the skills or experience to manage such a change process. 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